We use a result due to Rolin, Speissegger, and Wilkie to show that definable sets in certain o-minimal structures admit definable parameterizations by mild maps. We then use this parameterization to prove a result on the density of rational points on curves defined by restricted Pfaffian functions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Dewey: The ChicagoYears GEORGE DYKHUIZEN DEWEYCAMETO CHICAGOin the summer of 1894 as head professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago and left in January, 1905, to become professor of philosophy at Columbia University. During his Chicago years, Dewey's interests led him not only into the field of philosophy but also into that of education, and in each of these areas he acquired a retmtation which placed him (...) among the top thinkers in the country. His work in philosophy resulted in his being acclaimed, along with Charles S. Peirce and William James, as one of the three great founders of American pragmatism, and his achievements in education led to his being regarded as one of the country's most outstanding educational thinkers and a prime mover in educational reform. The University of Chicago was only four years old when Dewey arrived there, but already it had attained a high standing among the universities of the country. The main reason for this was that the University had set out to be not simply another college but a university, like the universities in Europe and like Johns Hopkins and Clark universities in this country. This meant that the graduate schools of the University were to be stressed and that a large part of the faculty was to devote itself exclusively to graduate instruction and research. The type of faculty member the University looked for "must be a teacher, but first and foremost he must be a scholar, in love with learning, with a passion for research, an investigator who could produce, and if what he produced was worthy, would wish to publish." ~ In the four years since its founding, the University had assembled one of the most outstanding faculties in the country, a faculty which included: T. C. Chamberlin in astronomy, Rolin D. Salisburg in geology, Albert Michelson in physics, Jacques Loeb in biology, J. M. Coulter in botany, Thorsten Veblen in political economy, Albion Small in sociology, Paul Shorey in Greek, J. H. Breasted in Egyptology, and R. G. Moulton in English. When Dewey came to the University, therefore, as head of the Department of Philosophy, this meant that he was to teach mostly graduate students, do research, and have associations with some of the most brilliant scholars in the country. These features of the new position had appealed strongly to Dewey when he was considering the offer to 1T. W. Goodspeed, A History of the University of Chicago. The First Quarter (Chicago: 1916), 201. [227] 228 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY become professor of philosophy at Chicago and were among the decisive factors in bringing him to the University. William Rainey Harper, president of the University, was in large measure responsible for its early successes. "Those massive buildings, millions of money, thousands of scholars and scores of teachers," wrote one of his admirers, "are a monument to the foresight, nerve, and ceaseless activity of W. R. Harper, a veritable Napoleon in the educational field." 2 Born July 26, 1856, Harper was three years older than Dewey and every bit as precocious. He received his A.B. degree from Muskingum College when he was fourteen; he entered Yale as a graduate student when he was seventeen and got his Ph.D. degree from there at the age of nineteen. Upon receiving his doctorate, he began a career teaching Hebrew first at the Baptist Union Theological Seminary in Chicago and then, in 1886, at Yale. Harper wrote extensively on theological matters and his views prompted an attack on his orthodoxy in 1888. He weathered the storm, however, and throughout his life was a staunch defender of liberal theological thought. Harper had tremendous vitality and enthusiasm, and these qualities, along with his scholarship, led to his appointment as first president of the University when it was founded in 1890. Harper and Dewey were to have close associations on the administrative level, and though many of these were to be pleasant and cordial, others turned out to be not so harmonious and led eventually to Dewey's resignation from the University. Though Harper was particularly concerned that a strong department of philosophy be established at the University, up to the time of Dewey's... (shrink)

ABSTRACT What, if anything, should we do when someone says they don’t believe in anthropogenic climate change? Or that they worry that a COVID-19 vaccine might be dangerous? We argue that in general, we face an epistemic duty to object to such assertions, qua instances of science denial and science sceptical discourse, respectively. Our argument builds on recent discussions in social epistemology, specifically surrounding the idea that we ought to speak up against (epistemically) problematic assertions so as to fulfil an (...) important epistemic obligation – namely, preventing epistemic harms in others. We show that both science denial (SD) and vaccine hesitant (VH) discourses are harmful in a distinctively epistemic sense, and as such generate an especially strong duty to voice our disagreement. As we also argue, this obligation is nonetheless defeasible: depending on the situational features of those involved, voicing an objection to VH discourse may actually end up doing more harm than good. We conclude by tracing what seems like a promising path towards restoring well-placed public trust in scientific testifiers. Doing so is key in order to guarantee equitable access to warranted beliefs about important subject matters, such as the safety of vaccines, to all segments of society. (shrink)

This article will rework the classical question ‘Can a machine think?’ into a more specific problem: ‘Can a machine think anything new?’ It will consider traditional computational tasks such as prediction and decision-making, so as to investigate whether the instrumentality of these operations can be understood in terms of the creation of novel thought. By addressing philosophical and technoscientific attempts to mechanise thought on the one hand, and the philosophical and cultural critique of these attempts on the other, I will (...) argue that computation’s epistemic productions should be assessed vis-à-vis the logico-mathematical specificity of formal axiomatic systems. Such an assessment requires us to conceive automated modes of thought in such a way as to supersede the hope that machines might replicate human cognitive faculties, and to thereby acknowledge a form of onto-epistemological autonomy in automated ‘thinking’ processes. This involves moving beyond the view that machines might merely simulate humans. Machine thought should be seen as dramatically alien to human thought, and to the dimension of lived experience upon which the latter is predicated. Having stepped outside the simulative paradigm, the question ‘Can a machine think anything new?’ can then be reformulated. One should ask whether novel behaviour in computing might come not from the breaking of mechanical rules, but from following them: from doing what computers do already, and not what we might think they should be doing if we wanted them to imitate us. (shrink)

Various human rights issues arise from the intersection of adolescent motherhood and HIV. While health rights may be the most obvious means by which to address such issues through policy development and legislative means, the right to health is not the only human right that may provide recourse or relief in this regard. This article considers an unexplored avenue of approaching such issues through reliance on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. The International Covenant on Economic, Social (...) and Cultural Rights provides for the ‘right to science’ in article 15(1)(b) and more recently, as elaborated on in General Comment no. 25 of 2020. This article considers how this right can be relied upon to address issues pertaining to adolescent motherhood and HIV. Precedent from a Venezuelan Supreme Court decision is considered, as well as the normative content of the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. This may be another legal means by which to hold states accountable for the health of young mothers and their children, especially as new practices, medicines and treatments emerge regarding HIV. (shrink)

Objections to the computational theory of cognition, inspired by twentieth century phenomenology, have tended to fixate on the embodiment and embeddedness of intelligence. In this paper I reconstruct a line of argument that focusses primarily on the abstract nature of scientific models, of which computational models of the brain are one sort. I observe that the critique of scientific abstraction was rather commonplace in the philosophy of the 1920s and 30s and that attention to it aids the reading of The (...) Organism ([1934] 1939) by the neurologist Kurt Goldstein. With this background in place, we see that some brief but spirited criticisms of cybernetics by two later thinkers much influenced by Goldstein, Georges Canguilhem (1963) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1961), show continuity with the earlier discussions of abstraction in science. (shrink)

This article examines the mutual influence between Ernst Cassirer and his cousin, the neurologist Kurt Goldstein. For both Cassirer and Goldstein, views on the nature of human cognition were fundamental to their understanding of scientific knowledge, and these were informed by both philosophical theorizing and empirical research on pathologies of the nervous system. Following Cassirer, and in agreement with the physicalism of the Vienna Circle, Goldstein held that the physical sciences had progressed by arriving at abstract, mathematical representations to take (...) the place of qualitative characterizations of observable reality. In tension with physicalism, Goldstein was not sanguine about the fruitfulness of the abstractive approach in biology. He proposed that biology must adhere to its own sui generis methods of observation and experimentation in order to obtain knowledge of the “natures” of living organisms. I argue that there is a parallel with Cassirer’s assertion of the differences between physical and cultural sciences, underwritten by the deployment of varying symbolic functions. I also propose that the neurological writings of Goldstein are an important backdrop to Cassirer’s positive evaluation of abstract thought, in contrast to the pessimism regarding a worldview dominated by scientific abstractions expressed by philosophers such as Bergson, Whitehead, and Husserl. (shrink)

Kinetic demixing in quaternary mixed oxides has not been investigated previously, either theoretically or experimentally. In this theoretical study, we derive simple and exact analytical expressions that describe the steady-state cation concentration profiles resulting from kinetic demixing in mixed oxides of the O type. The concentration profiles are expressed in terms of cation-vacancy exchange frequency ratios. We assume a random distribution of cations and make use of the Moleko-Allnatt exact sum-rule expression relating the phenomenological coefficients in the ternary random alloy (...) to the vacancy mechanism operative. We employ Monte Carlo simulation of kinetic demixing to verify the result of the analysis. We discuss how kinetic demixing profiles can be processed to obtain atom-vacancy exchange frequency ratios. We also discuss how atom-vacancy exchange frequencies themselves might be obtained from available diffusivities in the quaternary oxide. (shrink)

There is a perplexing transition in Dr. Reza Davari's thought, when he problematizes the relation between Iranian and Western history/cultures, on which this paper is focusing. The interperative objective is to clarify this transition on the basis of the implicit relation between the two most fundamental concepts in his earlier and later thought respectively westernization and underdevelopment. Although, by this transition, the level of discussion transits from an ontologico-philosophical to an intellectualist one. So, there are two different levels of problematization (...) in his thought which differ deeply. Therefore, we are not just dealing with the substitution of fundamental concepts, but with different problematizations and different levels of discussion. Obviously, there will be new problems arising which are not just concerning with the justification of the transition but with the problematization of westernization itself. Finally, it's been concluded that in order to clarify these new problems, we should step back to the level of philosophical discussion, and first of all to the clarification of the I-not-I relation which has been neglected thoroughly in the whole project. (shrink)

Scholars who deal with Heidegger’s philosophy often remark the scarcity of his references to phenomenological reduction as a means to grant access to the point of view of the being-in-the-world of the Dasein, the central theme of his early philosophy. Also the role of phenomenological reduction in Heidegger’s philosophy makes problem, as he criticizes Husserl for making of reduction a mere tool to reveal a pure, timeless and extra-worldly conscience – an untenable claim, according to Heidegger, for Dasein’s being-in-the-world, as (...) his most original way of being, can never be put out of play by any reduction. The role of transcendental reduction in Heidegger’s phenomenology is the theme of the present paper. (shrink)

Descartes' methodical doubt is being criticized by naïve realists and others who don't find doubt as a good starting point for metaphysical thought, however, the philosophical achievements of his method have been absorbed in all later philosophies. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate how an inevitable question concerning the foundation of Descartes' mathesis universalis, which led him to investigate this foundation by applying this very method in Metaphysics, has finally enabled him to discover his most important philosophical principle, (...) i.e., the necessary relation between being and reason in the identity of the "I". To demonstrate this, after summarizing the fundamental ideas of mathesis uneversalis, and showing the inner necessity of introducing the methodical doubt to fortify these ideas, the decisive role of metaphysical doubt as the third step of the methodical doubt, and malicious demon as its second phase would be highighted. It would also become clear that the metaphysical doubt has a great importance as a turning point from different aspects: as a knot that ties mathesis universalis with its underlying Metaphysics; as a bridge from within the psychological "I" to the metaphysical "I". (shrink)

In Fiction, Truth and Literature, Lamarque and Olsen argue that if a critic claims or attempts to prove that the outlook of a work of literature is true or false, he is not engaging in literary or aesthetic appreciation. This paper argues against this position by adducing cases where literary critics discuss the truth or falsity of a work’s view, when their opinions are obviously relevant to the work’s aesthetic assessment. The paper considers in detail the way factual errors damage (...) a work’s aesthetic standing, and shows that Lamarque and Olsen’s alternative account of the role of propositional truths in literature only looks plausible because it considers a restricted range of examples. Finally, it considers the role intention, date and genre play in discussions of the aesthetic damage done by literal falsehood. (shrink)

Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology makes two claims. The thesis of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are likely to generate perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than perspectives generated by other social positions. The situated knowledge thesis claims that all scientific knowledge is socially situated. The bias paradox is the tension between these two claims. Whereas the thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that a standard of impartiality enables one to judge some perspectives as (...) better than others, the situated knowledge thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge is partial. I argue that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification provides a solution to the bias paradox. Moreover, contextualism enables me to give empirical content to the thesis of epistemic privilege, thereby making it into a testable hypothesis. (shrink)

Legendary director, actor, author, and provocateur Werner Herzog has incalculably influenced contemporary cinema for decades. This essay collection by professional philosophers and film theorists from around the globe offers a diversity of perspectives on how the thinking behind the camera is revealed in the action Herzog captures in front of it.